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The Darwinian Cage
Evolutionary Psychology as Moral Science
Richard Hamilton
We take it as a rule that any attempt to explain social life in psychological
terms is manifestly in error. (Durkheim, Rules of Sociological Method)
The jargon of evolutionary psychology has recently migrated from a few
minor American universities into the academic mainstream and thence into
Sunday supplements and dinner party conversations. It has even formed the
backdrop to at least one award-winning novel (McEwan, 1997). Evolution-
ary psychology and other similar ‘biological’ explanations of human conduct
pervade the Zeitgeist and, as Kenan Malik has persuasively argued, they
tap into a prevailing mood of cultural pessimism. Evolutionary psychology,
it seems, speaks to our desire to see the worst in ourselves (Malik, 2002).
Evolutionary psychology’s ubiquity is such that we need to distinguish
carefully between its pop manifestations and its intellectual core. An inter-
esting feature of this movement is that, alongside this massive upsurge in
popular interest, there has also been a proliferation of all the trappings of
‘normal’ science (John Dupré, personal communication). This allows evolu-
tionary psychology to distance itself from some of its cruder popularizations
while simultaneously benefiting from that popular interest. This does not
mean that evolutionary psychology is a serious scientific enterprise with a
few over-enthusiastic adherents. On the contrary, evolutionary psychology
is empirically unwarranted and conceptually incoherent to such an extent
that it is a matter of professional sociological concern why it has come to
achieve such a degree of popularity.1
However, given the level of interest, it surely behoves social theorists
to subject its claims to serious analytic scrutiny. After all, no serious thinker
questions the potential relevance of evolutionary insights to the understand-
ing of beings with a complex natural history. The problem with evolution-
ary psychology is not that it attempts to investigate the relevance of
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evolutionary theory for current human society but that it does so in ways
that assume that that relevance is in some sense straightforward and
obvious. Perhaps, then, one purpose of a critique of evolutionary psychol-
ogy may be to clear the way for more rigorous enquiries into the evolution-
ary bases of human social life.
Evolutionary Psychology’s Relationships to Sociobiology
Evolutionary psychology emerged from within the sociobiological paradigm.
Human sociobiology sought to draw upon the study of other social animals
to create accounts of human social conduct. It regarded current social
science as hopelessly ill-informed about biology and in some of his less
guarded pronouncements, E.O. Wilson in particular has appeared to
entertain imperialistic ambitions towards social science (Wilson, 1975).
Contemporary evolutionary psychology shares that hostility and some of
those ambitions. For instance, it seeks to found social science on an account
of evolved psychology that has little space for social facts as they have been
traditionally conceived.
At the same time, it has distanced itself from sociobiology in several
crucial respects. For instance, sociobiology was confronted by some fairly
devastating political and ideological criticisms, and these played a large
role in the enterprise’s decline (Rose et al., 1980). Evolutionary psychol-
ogists, for the most part, have been keen to distance themselves from any
stance which appears to endorse racism, sexism or social inequality. While
some evolutionary psychologists lament the decline of 19th-century values
(Wright, 1995), others see evolutionary psychology as fully compatible with
postmodernity (Nicholson, 1998). Liberal and feminist evolutionary
psychologists have been keen to stress its positive implications for feminism
and anti-racism (Cronin, 1993; Malik 1996). It is simplistic, therefore, to
dismiss evolutionary psychology as reactionary politics.
Evolutionary psychologists have distanced themselves from sociobiol-
ogy on intellectual as well as political grounds. The most significant
development in this respect has been the distinctive marriage between
neo-Darwinianism and the computational theory of mind that has come to
characterize recent work in the field (Barkow et al., 1992; Pinker, 1997.)
Indeed, the peculiar confusions that arise when the evolutionary psychol-
ogists tackle social life stem less from their biological ambitions than from
their view of human beings as disembodied information-processors. In the
context of this Special Issue on Cognitivism, I will concentrate on this issue.
The Evolved Computer
Evolutionary Psychology vs Social Science
Evolutionary psychology’s fundamental tenet is that our minds are as much
a product of our evolutionary heritage as our opposable thumbs. This claim
derives from a highly persuasive argument: assuming a basic commitment
to naturalistic explanation, if our brains and bodies are the product of our
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evolutionary history, then the same must go for the mind. This argument has
an important corollary: if minds have evolved, then the behaviour that minds
produce is best viewed in the light of evolutionary assumptions. Since no
one wishes to keep company with the creationists, the evolutionary psycho-
logical programme appears irresistible. Yet there is a world of difference
between accepting the Darwinian theory of evolution and accepting evolu-
tionary psychology.
To understand why, it is necessary to consider what evolutionary
psychologists ask us to accept about the relationship between mind and
action. They emphatically reject the idea that evolution only provides us
with broad behavioural propensities and reserve their harshest criticism for
such an equivocal endorsement of the neo-Darwinian gospel (Symons,
1992). They argue that natural selection would have eliminated broad
mental plasticity and propose instead a mind composed of domain-specific
modules that generate shallow behavioural output. These modules are
heuristic devices that enabled our ancestors both to survive the challenges
posed by the Pleistocene environment and to reproduce. These modules
require minimal environmental stimuli to be triggered; indeed, our cogni-
tive architecture even defines what counts as appropriate stimuli (Barkow
et al., 1992: 82–3). This has become known as the Massive Modularity
Hypothesis.
An immediate problem arises here. Much of the strength of evolution-
ary psychology’s premises derives from assumptions about the brain and its
evolution. Yet, evolutionary psychology offers scant neurological evidence
for any of these assertions. They are advanced as hypotheses about mental
function and what evolutionary psychologists really mean by modules are
fixed patterns of behaviour or cognitive activity, rather than defined areas
of the brain. Nevertheless, the implicit account of the brain that underlies
the modular theory of mind is that mental function is fixed and this should,
one supposes, pan out at the level of neurological structure. This presents
evolutionary psychologists with a challenge: everything we know about the
brain suggests that it is not structured in the way that would be required to
substantiate the massively modular view of mind. Evidence from studies of
brain-injured patients and investigations into the development of the normal
brain over a lifetime suggest that the relationship between mental function
and neurological structure is an extremely flexible one, with functions being
assigned and re-assigned to different areas of the brain throughout one’s
lifespan.2 Indeed, from an evolutionary perspective, it can be argued that
such flexibility is itself the distinctively human adaptation.
This does not represent a decisive objection to evolutionary psychol-
ogy’s view of the mind: some way may be found of reconciling the claim of
relative mental rigidity with the known facts about neural plasticity. Never-
theless, without much more detailed work in this area it is hard to see how
evolutionary psychologists can manage to negotiate between their commit-
ments to massive modularity and their equally strong commitment to the
unity of science in the face of fairly strong evidence against massive
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modularity from a hard scientific discipline. As we shall see below, there
are equally strong conceptual grounds for rejecting massive modularity. Yet,
without massive modularity there is little to distinguish evolutionary
psychology from the view, shared by any serious social scientist, that our
current conduct has some relation, however inchoate, to our evolutionary
past.
Such issues might seem to be of little professional interest to social
scientists. However, while evolutionary psychologists have rejected some
aspects of E.O. Wilson’s sociobiology, they have retained his imperialist
ambitions. Evolutionary psychology sees itself as a grand unifying theory of
the social science, which holds that:
. . . nothing the organism interacts with in the world is nonbiological to it,
and so for humans cultural forces are biological, social forces are bio-
logical. . . . The social and the cultural are not alternatives to the biological.
They are aspects of evolved human biology and, hence, they are the kinds of
things to which evolutionary analysis can be properly applied. (Tooby and
Cosmides, 1992: 86)
With such assertions, evolutionary psychologists declare all-out war on
social science, which they regard as dominated by an outdated ‘social
constructionist’ paradigm which ignores the facts of our biology in favour of
a social learning model of the mind. For evolutionary psychology, society is
synonymous with culture, which is itself merely ‘the manufactured product
of evolved psychological mechanisms situated in individuals living in
groups’ (1992: 24). While there may be some degree of complexity intro-
duced at population level, there are no true social facts. All social processes
are psychological processes writ large; all psychological processes are in
turn explicable in terms of biology.
On the basis of these assumptions, evolutionary psychologists aim to
re-build the social sciences root and branch. In doing so, they seek to substi-
tute their distinctive technique of evolutionary functional analysis for
explanations based on learning and cultural transmission. This technique
aims to isolate a given behaviour pattern, model the algorithm generating
it, and then assess their hypothetical model against palaeographic and
anthropological data. It is important to note that evolutionary functional
analysis makes no assumptions about the current reproductive advantages
of a given behaviour (Symons, 1992: 138). In biological terminology, while
modules are adaptations, they need not necessarily be adaptive. In contrast
to previous sociobiological approaches, it is sufficient that the module
generates behaviour that would have increased the inclusive fitness of our
Pleistocene ancestors. Thus it would not constitute a refutation of an evolu-
tionary psychological hypothesis if a particular behaviour does not convey
reproductive benefits under current circumstances. Indeed, a behaviour
might be entirely counterproductive in current circumstances and still be
explicable in terms of an evolved module. We would hardly expect a module
108 Theory, Culture & Society 25(2)
105-125 086793 Hamilton (D)  20/12/07  17:55  Page 108
adapted to the Pleistocene savannah to map well onto the modern urban
landscape.
The Atavistic Misfit Hypothesis
This brings us to the major contribution evolutionary psychology seeks to
make to the analysis of social problems. Evolutionary psychologists claim
that our cognitive architecture is not entirely well suited to the present-day
environment and that, left unchecked, it will generate unacceptable behav-
iour. This ‘misfit hypothesis’ provides them with a key to understanding ‘the
miseries of “civilization”: child abuse, sectarianism, sexism, racism, tsarism
[sic], much mental illness and crime, pornography and substance abuse’
(Nicholson, 1998: 1056). The scare quotes around civilization are telling,
for they highlight a crucial ambivalence in the evolutionary psychological
account: it is never clear whether the miseries in question are those which
confront civilization or those which are brought about by it. Steven Pinker
is undecided on this question, claiming that:
. . . human vice is proof that biological adaptation is, speaking literally, a
thing of the past. Our minds are adapted to the small foraging bands in which
our family spent ninety-nine percent of its existence, not to the topsy-turvy
contingencies we have created since the agricultural and industrial revol-
utions. (Pinker, 1998: 207)
This misfit hypothesis restates a Cartesian problematic in the neo-Darwinian
idiom, namely, how to reconcile everyday moral categories with a mechan-
ical view of persons. Evolutionary psychology is concerned with the very
possibility of norms, values and obligations in a world that is apparently
composed of self-interested biological individuals. As Pinker expresses
this with his usual eloquence, ‘how did ought emerge from a universe of
particles and planets, genes and bodies?’ (1998: 559).3 This is often referred
to as the ‘problem of altruism’.4 The biological sciences, particularly
ethology, can make an obvious contribution here. Nevertheless, ‘vice’ is
hardly an unambiguously scientific category. We should therefore consider
how evolutionary psychologists consider moral problems to fall within their
explanatory remit.
Evolutionary Psychology’s Moral Theory
My primary claim is this: its biological rhetoric notwithstanding, evolution-
ary psychology is a positivist social science in the grand tradition which
seeks to mechanize morality in order to facilitate social engineering. It does
so on the basis of the assumption that a causal chain exists between our
evolved modules and certain undesirable behaviours. We must undermine
this assumption if we are to challenge evolutionary psychology’s claims to
social explanation. In what follows I will argue three things. First, that to
replace our everyday moral vocabulary in the way that evolutionary psychol-
ogy proposes is neither desirable nor possible. Second, that evolutionary
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psychology consequently operates with an impoverished view of actions.
Finally, that evolutionary psychology’s causal ambitions condemn it to either
reductionism or vacuity.
The Evolutionary Origins of Human Wickedness
Evolutionary psychologists believe that their misfit hypothesis explains
human vice. Among the vices offered up for explanation by evolutionary
psychologists are rape (Thornhill and Palmer 2000; Thornhill and Thorn-
hill 1983), murder and domestic violence (Daly and Wilson,1988), sexual
jealousy (Buss, 2000), sexual harassment (Studd and Gattiker, 1991) and
occupational stress (Nicholson, 1998). All these candidate explanations
take the same form: for any given social problem we can postulate the exist-
ence of a module (or modules) which contributed to the inclusive fitness of
our Pleistocene ancestors but which is out of place in current society. If we
succeed in isolating this module, we are better equipped to deal with its
consequences. Evolutionary psychologists are pessimistic about non-
instrumental ways of dealing with social problems; they prefer coercive
measures for controlling our biology. For instance, in their book on rape,
Thornhill and Palmer advocate the Talibanization of society, involving
stricter penalties, compulsory anti-rape training for men (as a precondition
for obtaining a driver’s licence), and possibly the cloistration of nubile
women (2000: 198–9).
Evolutionary psychology focuses, then, on instances of human
irrationality. What characterizes all of the aforementioned problems is that
they present a challenge to both normative and instrumental conceptions of
rationality. Evolutionary psychologists operate with a vaguely Hegelian
strategy; they aim to reveal the cunning of evolutionary reason behind these
apparently irrational actions. The danger here is that in redefining the
phenomena in this way we may lose sight of them altogether. One cannot
simply abstract out the normative content of attributions of irrationality.
Some of the problems facing an evolutionary psychological explanation
of a complex phenomenon can be clearly seen when we examine the
question of substance abuse, which some evolutionary psychologists have
suggested has an evolutionary basis (Nicholson, 1997). It is morally and
intellectually problematic; at the same time, one can see the plausibility of
a biological explanation. For certain types of addictive behaviour, as
expressed among certain individuals, there are strong indications of
biochemical mediation, perhaps in the form of irregularities in the various
receptors in the brain. So, on the surface it might seem an ideal contender
for a problem to which one might seek a contribution from evolutionary
psychology. Any biological explanation rests upon assumptions about
evolution, so in that sense it would have to be an evolutionary explanation.
For instance, it is quite possible that the ability to tolerate alcohol and
alkaloids may have been adaptive in our evolutionary past. Clearly, evolu-
tionary psychology seeks to provide more than a plausible historical
narrative about the origins of substance abuse.
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The first problem here is that any such account would be an expla-
nation of both substance abuse and moderate substance use. The fact that
our ancestors could tolerate environmental alcohol explains both the guests
at a suburban dinner party sipping Chardonnay and the hopeless bum on
the railway tracks guzzling sherry. Moreover, for an evolutionary psycho-
logical explanation to do any work here one would need a clearly defined
phenomenon which could be mapped onto our mental architecture and
ultimately derived from known facts about our evolutionary history. One
need only reflect on the sheer diversity of abusive and addictive behaviours
to realize the problems confronting evolutionary psychologists. While we
might accept that some forms of alcoholism, smoking and heroin addiction
have strong biological underpinnings, the same cannot be said for
addictions to love, shopping, gambling or Internet pornography.
The facts about addiction, then, are not exhausted by the facts of
biology. As Anthony Giddens points out, the concept of addiction only
makes sense in a certain type of society, one which values work and self-
development, and which has a conception of the appropriate use of time
(1992: 74). How would one, for instance, go about identifying an addict in
a society such as the Yanamamo, where drug abuse is a ubiquitous phenom-
enon? Even in cases where there is the marked involvement of biochemical
factors, distinguishing between an addiction and a habit, a use and an abuse,
is a conceptual and not an empirical task.
Furthermore, the plausibility of biochemical explanations in certain
cases should not lead us to endorse evolutionary psychology. For, despite
its association in the popular mind with molecular biology, evolutionary
psychology does not offer biochemical or genetic explanations.5 Instead, an
evolutionary psychological account of substance abuse would posit the
existence of a substance abuse module (or set of modules) which, when
triggered by a given set of environmental stimuli, would produce substance
abuse. The module would have served some function in the Pleistocene but
is now as moribund as the human appendix.
Careful attention would show us that the same problems attend on
computational reductionism as they do on its biochemical counterpart. The
computational model requires the existence of discrete addiction behaviours
as the output of a computational process. Since no such discrete behaviours
exist, this leaves the evolutionary psychologists confronting a dilemma:
either their proposed module accounts for an exceptionally wide class of
behaviours, including addictions; or they are forced into a reductionism
which treats the normative context as nugatory. Neither of these options
works: in what follows I will attempt to explain why.
Evolutionary Psychology’s Attack on Broad Mental Plasticity
To understand why the first move fails we should recall that the distinctive
feature of evolutionary psychology is its opposition to broad mental plastic-
ity. Central to the evolutionary psychologists’ attack on social science is
their assertion that evolution would work against mental plasticity (Barkow
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et al., 1992: 39). Narrow modules generate discrete behavioural events.6
The heritability of the module depends upon whether these behavioural
events allowed an organism to meet its evolutionary challenges in an
extremely short time span (1992: 100–8). Evolution does not select for
Hamlets: a hominid that sat around weighing up possible courses of action
would have been quickly eliminated in favour of his more decisive cousin.
Over evolutionary time, those modules which allowed the possessor to solve
problems quickly and effectively would have been selected for; those that
worked slowly or ineffectively would have been eliminated. Given this, an
evolutionary psychological explanation of substance abuse would need
either to postulate a specific addiction module, or it would propose that the
abuse results from some other module or combination of modules acting in
concert. An adaptive module for abuse is a contradiction in terms, since it
violates the neo-Darwinian assumption that any inherited module would
have conveyed positive reproductive benefits.7 At best, substance abuse
would be a by-product.
The admission that substance abuse might be a by-product would
remove anything distinctive about the evolutionary psychological expla-
nation. A module (or combination of modules) capable of generating a range
of behaviours broad enough to encompass the full range of addictions is to
all explanatory purposes identical to old-fashioned broad plasticity.8 If we
adopt this route, it is hard to see how the modular account explains the
addiction. For instance, we might conceivably construct a modular account
of drug use in terms of its evolutionary benefits. One could formulate some
interesting evolutionarily informed hypothesis to explain why certain people
take risks or seek pleasure. Nevertheless, an explanation of drug use is not
an explanation of drug abuse and it is the abuse that requires explanation.
As common sense and experiences like those of the returning Vietnam
servicemen clearly show, only a tiny sub-class of substance users become
abusers and even fewer become addicts; addiction is cyclical and closely
related to the life-cycle (Peele, 1998). An explanation that cannot distin-
guish between users and addicts is not an explanation of addiction at all.
We are therefore better off doing what social science typically does and
investigating addiction at the proximate level of motivation rather than its
evolutionary bases.
One option for the evolutionary psychologist would be to respond that
no theory could be expected to explain everything; evolutionary psychology
can only explain the underlying mechanisms. This leads to the following
problem: the only genuine evidential support for a modular hypothesis can
come from behaviour. Even if we could successfully isolate a part of the
brain associated with a hypothetical module, we would still need behav-
ioural data to ascertain whether it was the correct region. The problem
remains of how to isolate the behaviour falling within the explanatory remit
of evolutionary psychology without committing petitio principii.
In attempting to isolate discrete behaviours, evolutionary psychol-
ogists tend to specify the phenomena under investigation in such a way as
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to virtually guarantee confirming instances. To turn from our hypothetical
discussion of a module for substance abuse to a real case, recent (notori-
ous) studies of rape provide an example of this strategy in action. The
authors define rape as the coerced vaginal penetration of women of repro-
ductive age and downplay the relevance of male rape, rape on women
outside the reproductive age range, murderous rape and non-vaginal forms
of rape. This conceptual gerrymandering results, unsurprisingly, in the
confirmation of their hypothesis that rape is an evolved reproductive strategy
and not a crime of violence (Thornhill and Palmer, 2000; Thornhill and
Thornhill, 1983).9
This strategy is understandable, for, by evolutionary psychology’s own
criteria, a module which specifically generated the rape of octogenarians
and children, or non-vaginal rape, would have been eliminated from the
gene pool. Even one which enabled, rather than compelled, a hominid to do
these things would have been eliminated, since it would have been out-
reproduced by the hominid who raped only women of reproductive age.10
Thus, understanding rape in evolutionary psychological terms calls upon us
either to egregiously disregard the evidence or else to make the more modest
claim that some humans have a broad disposition for sexual violence, which
may or may not be instantiated in a module.11 The idea of such a broad
disposition is anathema to the whole spirit of evolutionary psychology, since
it is virtually identical to the derided standard social science model.
Moreover, such dispositional accounts are notoriously prone to vacuity.
Since all dispositions of the human animal have, sensu lato, an evolutionary
history, the claim that a rapist has an evolved propensity for sexual violence
is about as informative as saying that W.S. Gilbert had an evolved propen-
sity to write musical comedies or that politicians have an evolved propensity
to dissemble. What we require is a rigorous stipulation of the conditions
under which a propensity might manifest itself. Evolutionary psychology is
ill equipped to provide us with such information. When evolutionary psychol-
ogists attempt to do so, they run into insurmountable problems.
The Challenge of Reductionism
It is a commonplace of the philosophy of social science that the social
scientific investigator never encounters genuinely raw data. Her phenom-
ena come to her imbued with meanings. Alfred Schutz’s observations on the
differences between natural and social science remain pertinent:
The world of nature as explored by the natural scientist, does not ‘mean’
anything to the molecules, atoms and electrons therein. The observational
field of the social scientist, however, namely the social reality, has a specific
meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, acting and
thinking therein. (1954: 266–7)12
The human world is characterized by meaningful actions and interactions,
not simply by a series of events. Consequently, the ‘constructs of the social
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sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, namely constructs
of the constructs made by the actors of the social scene’ (1954: 267). The
social scientist investigates actions and interactions that are meaningful to
the participants and in ways that draw upon her understanding of those
meanings. Her very ability to identify the phenomenon she aims to study
rests upon her success in recognizing the point that it has for the
participants.
How, then, do evolutionary psychologists attempt to account for
meaningful interactions? A good place to explore this question is sexual
behaviour. Perhaps no other human interaction is more meaningful. And
given the centrality of reproduction to the neo-Darwinian position, evolu-
tionary psychologists have unsurprisingly focused heavily on human sexual
behaviour. Since human sexual behaviour lies at the cusp of culture and
biology, it would seem like an obvious place where evolutionary psychology
can make a contribution to our understanding.
The immediately striking thing about evolutionary psychological
accounts is their almost perverse narrowness of focus. Evolutionary psychol-
ogists seem obsessed with monogamy and its transgressions. Despite recent
reluctant acknowledgements that women can also be sexually active, evolu-
tionary psychology remains stuck within the framework of ‘coy’ females and
‘predatory’ males. Women, it is argued, are naturally faithful, while men are
naturally promiscuous (e.g. Buss, 1994; Symons, 1979).13 Left to their own
devices, men would propagate their genetic material as widely as possible.
It is only the restraining influence of society, combined with the risks to
paternity such philandering poses, that prevent them from doing this.
Infidelity occurs when those social restraints are loosened or when the
perceived benefits outweigh the risks.14
Evolutionary psychologists support their assertions with a combination
of animal studies, anthropological investigations and sociological evidence.
Social scientists might question these data on various grounds. Their use of
anthropological studies presupposes that hunter-gatherer tribes in the age
of anthropological research behave in analogous ways to our Pleistocene
ancestors. Appeals to animal studies disregard context and assume that
species as diverse as chaffinches and bonobo chimps resemble each other,
and us, far more than they differ. When dealing with contemporary phenom-
ena, evolutionary psychologists work with data obtained by straightforward
quantitative methods. Evolutionary psychologists are so reliant on variable
analysis that they discount all the problems raised by qualitative sociol-
ogists and treat categories such as ‘infidelity’ as easily quantifiable. Indeed
their whole search for phenotypic behaviours relies upon inferring psycho-
logical uniformities from statistical regularities.15
Since ‘infidelity’ is an indexical concept, we can only treat infidelity
as a discrete behavioural category by overlooking crucial differences. Evolu-
tionary psychologists tend to treat Western-style monogamy as the norm.16
Even in a Western context, we might ask what unites the bridegroom who
sleeps with a bridesmaid, a couple who decide to stay together for their
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children’s sake, turning a blind eye to each other’s indiscretions, and a pair
of middle-aged ‘swingers’. Evolutionary psychology would answer that they
are all executing an evolved strategy that enabled our ancestors to spread
their genes. However, to assume uniformity in this way means, inter alia,
that we treat as nugatory the different reasons people might give for their
actions. Indeed, Robin Baker, an extreme reductionist among neo-
Darwinians, makes scepticism towards reasons a programmatic feature of
evolutionary accounts of human conduct, which, he announces, should be:
. . . concerned with subconscious, physiological decisions by the body rather
than with conscious behavioural decisions. Of course, we are well aware that
these decisions take place against a backdrop of conscious rhetoric. Often,
conscious and subconscious strategies will concur but often they will not.
When they do not, we concern ourselves with what the body does, not with
what the person might think it is doing. As in many aspects of behaviour, it
seems likely that physiological programming has a more powerful influence
than any conscious rationalization. (Baker and Bellis, 1995: 185)
For Baker, the reasons people give for their actions are post hoc rationali-
zations for what their bodies did under the influence of their evolutionary
programme. On one point at least he is correct: evolutionary theory can have
nothing interesting to say about reasons, nor can reasons play any role in
its explanations. It is precisely this anti-teleological bent of Darwin’s theory
of evolution that accounts for its superiority. Darwin’s theories stand in a
worthy tradition of ridding biology of anthropomorphism. However, it is one
thing to cease talking about impersonal phenomena in personal terms; to
extend this injunction to persons is an entirely different matter.17 For to do
so means that we lose sight of the very phenomena we purport to explain.
Reductionism, Actions and Bodily Movements
The ignoble fate of behaviourism should warn us that the cost of abandon-
ing talk of reasons is to lose our ability to identify actions. What we have
instead are physical events in different contexts and an insoluble problem
about the relationship between event and context. Reductionist evolution-
ary psychology suggests that modules generate identical physical happen-
ings, which we imbue with cultural meanings. This cannot explain even the
simplest actions, as an example will demonstrate. Let us imagine that there
is a module which, when triggered by the appropriate environmental stimuli,
causes the index finger of the right hand to slowly raise and then lower by
approximately 4 cm. Perhaps this module evolved because our hunter-
gatherer forebears needed to signal the presence of prey or danger. In order
to do so, it was necessary for our Pleistocene ancestors to make just this
move, in just the right situation. A hominid who gestured in this way at the
wrong time, such as when no prey were present, would have been rapidly
eliminated, as would one who raised the wrong finger or was unable to raise
his finger at all.18
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This particular action is one which the American writer Bill Bryson
(1995/1999) describes in his account of living in a Yorkshire village. He
claims that the moment of his acceptance by the community came when
approaching drivers began to raise their right index finger from above the
steering wheel and lower it in just this way. It signalled if not warmth, then
at least a suspension of hostility. One could construct a plausible evolution-
ary history of the bodily movements underpinning this gesture. The question
is whether we could have an evolutionary psychological explanation.
The distinction between an evolutionary history and an evolutionary
psychological explanation lies in the fact that evolutionary psychology
would hope to explain the gesture in terms of its history without committing
the genetic fallacy. This is obviously a different kind of claim from that of
saying that both the cave dweller and the Yorkshiremen must possess certain
physiological structures that enable them to make the given gesture. The
evolutionary psychological explanation makes the Yorkshiremen’s actions
seem rather like a Balinese shadow theatre: behind the apparent gesture is
the cave dweller’s signalling.
If we reflect upon the example the mechanistic explanation is not even
plausible for our supposedly primitive ancestors. A successful gesture must
be understood and an unsuccessful gesture is not a gesture at all. To be
understood it must occupy some place within a set of practices. Otherwise,
there could be no difference between the caveman’s signal and any other
random movement he might have made. The idea of two cavemen signalling
to one another already presupposes a fairly sophisticated system of
communication. Thus the idea of their actions being the basic under-
pinnings of our modern ones becomes untenable. The putative Pleistocene
becomes simply one of the many complex cultural environments that human
beings have inhabited over the course of our development.
Our ability as agents or analysts to characterize an action relies on
being able to answer the question of what a particular bodily movement
means. The distinction between different gestures, and between a gesture
and a twitch, is a normative one. Depending upon the situation, the act of
raising one’s right index finger could be: a greeting; an insult; a command;
a dismissive gesture; a signal of non-committal; an attempt to squash a fly;
a press of a button; a cricket umpire’s decision or nothing at all.19 Further-
more, these performatives could be affected by a large number of other
physical movements. This opens up the possibility of mistakes and mis-
understandings, and a gesture is only a gesture to the extent that it is under-
stood. The only guarantors of that understanding are publicly available
criteria against which the gesture may be judged and justified.
Since these criteria are not psychological, evolutionary psychology’s
invocation of an adaptive module underpinning a gesture would explain
nothing that is not already explained by the idea that gestures require a
psycho-physiological underpinning. But if evolutionary psychology cannot
effectively explain an action as simple as raising a finger, how much more
insurmountable are the problems facing its attempt to explain drug abuse,
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rape, infidelity, murder and suicide. All of the intellectually puzzling and
morally problematic aspects of these phenomena (indeed anything that
actually requires explanation) are part of the weave of social life. For such
phenomena, normativity is not the icing on the cake: it is the cake.
Pinker’s Hedonistic Pluralism
Normativity represents a challenge for any simple mapping of current
behaviour onto our evolutionary history. For instance, the obvious facts of
contemporary sexual behaviour seem to leave us with two possibilities:
either we are not really motivated by the desire to spread our genes or we
somehow delude ourselves about our true motivation. However, while people
may occasionally regret having sex, we rarely have sex inadvertently. It is
hard therefore to see what it would mean to be deluded about a reproduc-
tive motive. If someone had unprotected sex on a regular basis in full knowl-
edge of the consequences, we might say their belief that they did not want
to get pregnant or make someone else pregnant was deluded. In other cases,
where they used contraception or performed a sexual act not involving
vaginal penetration, it makes no sense to impute a reproductive motive to
a non-reproductive act. Unless they bizarrely misidentified the act they were
performing, whatever their intention actually was, it was not to make babies.
More sophisticated evolutionary psychologists recognize this
problem. They realize that to discuss actions qua actions requires that we
at least take reasons into account. Pinker proposes a solution that goes
something like this: except for those cases where we are actually trying for
children, or where we at least would not mind having them, talk about a
reproductive motivation is unintelligible. We can, however, have sex for all
the reasons people typically have sex and still be executing an adaptive
mechanism. As with many of Pinker’s positions, it is difficult to see how
far he can move in this particular direction and still offer a distinctively
evolutionary psychological explanation. Put more bluntly, it is far from
clear how this position explains anything. If he is merely stating that our
Pleistocene ancestors had sex for their reasons and we for ours, this is both
uncontroversial and empty. In order for the Pleistocene world to explain
our world in the way Pinker believes it does, there needs to be some
connection between the two. Pinker attempts to provide this connection,
without falling prey to the kind of reductionism we find in Baker, by means
of a hedonistic theory of motivation.
Sexual desire is not people’s strategy to spread their genes. It’s people’s
strategy to attain the pleasures of sex, and the pleasures of sex are the genes’
strategy to propagate themselves. If the genes don’t get propagated it is
because we are smarter than they are. (Pinker, 1997: 44; see also pp. 524–5)
We have sex for pleasure. Our Pleistocene forbears had sex for pleasure and
evolution programmed them to find whatever enhanced their reproductive
fitness pleasurable. We share their psycho-physiological programming and
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thus men are inclined to sleep with as many nubile women as possible. It
is for this reason also that the use of contraception and other such non-
reproductive behaviours do not refute evolutionary psychological hypothe-
ses. Irrespective of whether the act results in reproduction, it is done for
pleasure and that pleasure is explicable as an evolved psychological adap-
tation. In similar vein, Donald Symons (1979: 299–300) argues that male
homosexuality confirms rather than refutes the evolutionary psychological
hypothesis; promiscuous male homosexuals are only doing what male
heterosexuals would do if females let them.
Not all evolutionary theorists share Pinker’s hedonistic theory of
motivation. Baker questions the notion that we have sex for pleasure:
The explanation usually trotted out is that we (and presumably other animals)
have sex because we enjoy it, because it brings us pleasure. But is that really
true? (1996: 9)
Baker unwittingly highlights an important problem for the hedonistic theory
of motivation. Pleasure is not an explanatory category, since explanations
based on pleasure are either vacuous or false. If when we say that people
have sex for pleasure all we mean is that any voluntary action is done for
pleasure, then this is undeniable. If however, we mean that we have sex
primarily to experience a tingling in the medial forebrain bundle, then this
is surely false. As Ryle pointed out, pleasure is immanent rather than
external to action. To say that I enjoy reading Tolstoy is to explain my
reading habits and not my neurochemistry (Ryle, 1954: 55). It is to tell
someone why I prefer dead Russians to live Englishmen. People have sex
for many other reasons than to achieve orgasm and part of what makes the
sexual act pleasurable are those reasons. Were this not the case, any activity
that created a physically pleasurable sensation would be an adequate
substitute for a sexual act.20
The Pluralist Option and the Belief-Desire Theory of Motivation
Furthermore, if Pinker regards pleasure as a cause of behaviour, then this
is vulnerable to another objection. Since the pleasure is consequent to (or
at least coterminous with) the act, the pleasure is not a true antecedent and
therefore cannot be the cause of the act. We can never be certain that an
act will bring us pleasure. It is not pleasure but a combination of a desire
(to experience pleasure) and a belief (that a given act will bring pleasure)
that causes the act. Thus Pinker’s hedonistic theory shades into a belief-
desire theory of motivation.
For those who hold such a theory, there is an ongoing difficulty of how
propositional attitudes (such as believing that an act will bring pleasure)
can play a causal role in behaviour.21 To resolve this, Pinker draws upon a
version of the causal theory of reference devised by Jerry Fodor and Hilary
Putnam.22 On Pinker’s (admittedly crude) reading of this theory, proposi-
tional attitudes cause behaviour by virtue of the fact that they:
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. . . symbolize things in the world because they are triggered by those things
via our sense organs, and because of what they do when they are triggered.
If the bits of matter that constitute a symbol are arranged to bump into the
bits of matter constituting another symbol in just the right way, the symbols
corresponding to one belief can give rise to new symbols corresponding to
another belief logically related to it, which can give rise to symbols corre-
sponding to other beliefs and so on. Eventually the bits of matter constitut-
ing a symbol bump into bits of matter connected to the muscles, and
behaviour happens. (Pinker, 1998: 25)
It must surely be the case that impacting bits of matter cause bodily move-
ments.23 I have, however, outlined above some problems with the idea that
behaviour can be reduced to bodily movements. For Pinker’s account to
succeed it would therefore need to avoid reductionism, while remaining an
evolutionary psychological position. Although his thesis is certainly an
ingenious attempt to solve the problem, it is ultimately unsuccessful.
Pinker’s account does not even answer the question it is intended to answer,
since how beliefs qua beliefs cause behaviour remains utterly opaque. His
thesis becomes either a reductionist one, in which beliefs are merely
epiphenomena or else he must break with certain key commitments of
evolutionary psychology.
The reasons for this are as follows. The relationship between a belief
and a causally efficacious bit of matter must be either necessary or contin-
gent. A given bit of matter M corresponds to the belief B. That it does so
must either result from some properties of M and/or B, or else their corre-
spondence occurs simply through happenstance. Similarly, either M must
possess certain unique properties, or else different bits of matter may also
fulfil M’s causal function. If M is causally efficacious because of some
unique set of properties, then either this ties in with the fact that M stands
in a certain relation to B, or it is coincidental. If this relationship is
coincidental, then the fact that M is connected to a certain propositional
attitude concerns us less than the fact that the given causal relationship
obtains between various bits of matter. It is not the propositional attitude
that causes the bodily movements, since any propositional attitude associ-
ated with M would do equally as well. When unpacked in this way, the
apparently pluralist position becomes indistinguishable from reductionism.
If, on the other hand, a necessary relationship obtains between M and
its accompanying belief, then a different set of problems emerges. Beliefs
are either sentences or else they are represented by sentences. If Pinker
holds that a necessary relationship exists between sentences and things in
the world, then this is a similar semantics to that considered by Wittgenstein
in the Tractatus and later subjected to a devastating auto-critique. On this
account, the propositional attitude sentence A becomes meaningful, not
only because it represents a causally efficacious bit of matter M, but also
because it corresponds to a belief B. This can mean one of two things: either
propositional attitude sentence A is the belief B simpliciter, or sentence A
represents that belief.
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Are Beliefs Symbols?
If a propositional attitude sentence plays its unique role by virtue of what
it represents, then what it represents is either a further proposition (in which
case we confront the danger of infinite regress) or the propositional attitude
sentence represents something pre-linguistic, such as a neurological state.
Even if we could solve the concomitant problems of translation, we would
still need to resolve a further problem. If a belief is a neurological state
represented by a propositional attitude sentence, then belief B only becomes
causally efficacious to the extent that it stands for neurological state C. We
therefore return to the question of the relationship between belief B and
something else, namely, neurological state C.
If that relationship is coincidental, then what matters is the causal
function of C and belief B becomes epiphenomenal. If the relationship is
necessary, then we are asserting that a propositional attitude sentence
stands in a necessary relationship to: a brain state; a chain of events leading
to a given behaviour; and ‘things in the world’. Even this would not solve
the problem Pinker sets out to solve, since the belief itself plays no true
causal role and again we collapse into reductionism.
If, conversely, a belief is primarily a set of symbols, then new problems
arise. John Heil (1981) has summarized the implications for cognitive
science of Wittgenstein’s self-criticism, namely, that cognitive science
requires a notion of internal representation but representation requires the
public use of symbols in rule-governed ways. Both the later Wittgenstein
and Saussure have pointed out that there can be no necessary connection
between a proposition and that which it represents, since that relationship
could, in principle, be fulfilled by various other sets of symbols. The only
guarantor of that relationship is the regularity with which people use the
symbols in question (see Harris, 1988).
If Pinker is asserting that a belief’s role in mental causation is a result
of its symbolic function rather than the state of affairs it represents, then
this requires either that the internal role has an essential reference to its
public function (something evolutionary psychology’s individualist method-
ology cannot countenance) or else that these symbols have a meaning for
the internal mental states themselves. This, however, calls upon us either
to accord mental states with powers of interpretation only legitimately
attributed to competent human language users, or else to regard interpret-
ation as a mechanical response. On this view, propositional attitude A means
what it does simply by causing response R. But such a view skirts perilously
close to the reductionism Pinker’s solution was designed to avoid, for any
sentence that causes the response will do.
The Logical Grammar of Belief
If Pinker wishes to retain the insight that a propositional attitude sentence
is a particular belief, desire, hope, etc., then a different set of considerations
comes into play. The logical grammar of the concept of ‘belief’ encompasses
120 Theory, Culture & Society 25(2)
105-125 086793 Hamilton (D)  20/12/07  17:55  Page 120
far more than can be captured in mechanical terms. Beliefs are, inter alia,
true or false, well or ill founded, consistent or inconsistent, etc. Pinker’s
explanation of the causal role of beliefs allows no scope for these distinc-
tions, unless truth becomes identical to the propensity to cause a given
behaviour.
Such an option overlooks the fact that a false belief may cause the
same behaviour as a true one. My belief that coal contains valuable nutri-
ents and my belief that eating coal relieves heartburn may both be involved
in my decision to eat coal but only one of them is a true belief.24 The truth
or falsity of the proposition embedded in the propositional attitude sentence
is independent of my decision to eat coal. Therefore an account of the truth
or falsity of a belief cannot be based upon whether it leads to a particular
course of action. This would relativize truth, making it synonymous with a
belief’s propensity to cause actions in individuals or groups, a position
Pinker would surely wish to avoid, since the truth of his theory would itself
be determined solely by pragmatic considerations.
Moreover, the belief-desire theory assumes that it is the belief-that-p
that motivates an action and not simply p. Any belief, whether true or false,
can give rise to other beliefs and actions. My belief that coal contains
nutrients may give rise to the belief that charcoal does too and lead me to
chew charcoal. From Pinker’s insistence on the importance of beliefs
symbolizing things in the world, we might infer that only true propositions
can play a causal role. But then this would be to abandon the belief-desire
model since it would be a state of affairs, and not the belief, which caused
the action. The belief would be, at most, the psychological intermediary
between states of affairs and actions. If, however, he sought to abandon the
notion of truth he would also have to abandon the concept of information
central to his theory of mind, since only true propositions are informative.
Misinformation is no information at all.25
Conclusion
To summarize these arguments, while Pinker’s pluralistic solution to the
problem of normativity seems an attractive compromise, it is ultimately
untenable. Under pressure it collapses into the reductionist picture in which
beliefs, values and reasons are merely epiphenomena. Where he seeks to
maintain some scope for our reasons, he is forced to abandon central
commitments of the evolutionary psychological stance and make conces-
sions to externalism. Evolutionary psychology, in its current form, requires
a commitment to psychological causation and methodological individual-
ism. While Pinker may be the acceptable face of evolutionary psychology,
Baker is its more consistent representative.
Both reductionist and pluralist evolutionary psychology founder on
issues of normativity. As a contribution to social science, evolutionary
psychology inadvertently concedes that the really interesting things about
human beings, namely our ability to be moral or immoral; to form friend-
ships and to cheat on our partners; to create cultures and to vandalize them;
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to wage war and to make peace treaties; and to form governments and engage
in corruption, can only be accounted for in normative terms.
Indeed the various solutions evolutionary psychologists offer for social
problems all insist on the need to overcome our biology. On occasion, Pinker
even goes so far as to deny any role to biology in the moral sphere, claiming
that:
. . . happiness and virtue have nothing to do with what natural selection
designed us to do in the ancestral environment. They are for us to determine.
(1998: 52)
It would be rather difficult to find a social scientist these days who accorded
such a limited scope for biological factors. This then is the quandary facing
evolutionary psychology in its imperial pretensions towards the social
sciences. It is only explanatory when it ceases to be evolutionary psychol-
ogy; as long as it remains evolutionary psychology, it explains nothing. The
causal account it hopes to substitute for our normative ones fails at every
level. The modular theory proposed by evolutionary psychology can only
be rendered useful to the social sciences by a series of Procrustean
manoeuvres. Such is the effort involved, and so meagre are the rewards, that
we would be ill advised to attempt them.
Notes
1. David J. Buller (2005) has recently subjected all of evolutionary psychology’s
central empirical hypotheses to a detailed and ultimately devastating methodologi-
cal and empirical critique and found all of them wanting. I will refer to his work at
various points throughout this article.
2. For a review of the relevant literature see Buller (2005: 136–8).
3. The simple answer to Pinker’s question is that it didn’t. The world in which
‘ought’ emerged was not composed of such things other than in a trivial sense. It
was a world of people with needs and obligations, duties and desires.
4. Which, as John Dupré (1998) notes, assumes that altruism is a problem in ways
that selfishness is not.
5. I mean by this that evolutionary psychology is extremely vague on the neuro-
logical, physiological and chemical details of its explanations. Steven Rose (1998)
brings his experience as a molecular chemist to bear in attacking evolutionary
psychology’s talk about genes.
6. Evolutionary psychologists tend to equivocate on this point, arguing that one
may still have behavioural flexibility and narrow modules. At the end of the day
their dilemma remains: either they are reductionist or they are vacuous. Unless one
can isolate modules then the whole evolutionary psychological project collapses;
the only realistic way of isolating modules comes from isolating phenotypical behav-
iours. The way in which they isolate ‘phenotypical’ behaviours is usually from
statistical generalizations, of which more below.
7. Though there have been some wilder speculations that taking drugs may help
attract mates by demonstrating a man’s fearlessness and/or immunity to poisons.
Even if this story turned out to be true it would only explain drug use, not drug
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addiction. After all, while there is a certain plausibility to the idea that the risk-
taking associated with drug use might be attractive to some, surely no female would
be attracted to an addict. Also, like much of evolutionary psychology, this story only
applies to men.
8. The same goes for the idea of a module for each addiction, including as yet
unrecognized ones.
9. For a fuller response to evolutionary psychology’s lamentable account of rape
see Hamilton (2002/3).
10. This is precisely the rationale used to explain mate preferences. The idea is
that men have evolved a preference only for women of reproductive age and that
hominids who mated indiscriminately would have been wiped out.
11. Even the identification between rape and violence is problematic since it
excludes rapes which involve fraud or intoxication.
12. Recent philosophy of science has tended to stress that this may also be an issue
confronting the natural scientist, albeit to a lesser extent
13. Robin Baker has put a slightly more Machiavellian spin on this. Women, he
argues, are better served by appearing to be faithful and thus obtaining financial
support for their offspring, while at the same time seeking dalliances on the side.
See Baker (1996) and Baker and Bellis (1995).
14. This reveals an assumption running through evolutionary psychology that bad
things are to be explained in biological terms, while good things come within the
auspices of society. Even if this were true, it is hard to see how infidelity can be a
value-free category susceptible to scientific investigation. To understand why, we
need only consider how we would identify an instance of infidelity without the prior
assumption that fidelity is a good thing.
15. See the various commentators on Buss’s article in Behavioral and Brain
Sciences (Buss, 1989).
16. See for instance the much vaunted study by David M. Buss (1989). Despite its
self-proclaimed rigour, of the 37 cultures studied the overwhelming majority are
Western or postcolonial.
17. There is a long-standing and rather tedious debate within philosophy about
whether reasons can be causes. I do not intend intervening in this debate other than
to mention that one of the consequences of blurring the distinction between reasons
and causes is that one ends up treating causes in the physical world as types of
reasons, in precisely the way evolutionary psychologists do.
18. If this sounds ludicrously mechanistic it is precisely such a mechanistic denial
of intelligent action that underlies an evolutionary psychology account of intelli-
gent behaviour.
19. The same thing goes of course for the Pleistocene gesture.
20. Among other things, the hedonistic theory of motivation ignores the important
distinction between justified and vicarious pleasure.
21. ‘Propositional attitude’ is a piece of analytic philosophical terminology meant
to characterize those mental states such as beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc., which
embed a proposition. So the belief in Father Christmas is the propositional attitude:
‘He believes that [Father Christmas exists].’
22. Despite the fact that Pinker pays them fulsome praise, it is unlikely that the
theory’s developers would reciprocate. Hilary Putnam has advanced a set of devas-
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tating critiques against his own earlier beliefs in both the computational theory of
mind and the causal theory of reference in the form advanced by Pinker (Putnam,
1992). Even Fodor is decidedly lukewarm about the use to which Pinker puts the
theory (Fodor, 1998).
23. The true story, one suspects, is a little more complex than Pinker implies. It
is not irrelevant, for instance, that some of the ‘bits of matter’ in question are
neuropeptides, others enzymes and others electrical signals.
24. British coal-miners used to suck coal to relieve heartburn.
25. There is, of course, a fundamental ambiguity at work here between a mathe-
matical and an everyday conception of information. On this issue see Coulter
(1995).
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